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Solar Radiation Management (SRM) is an umbrella term for a set of proposed technological 
responses to climate change. SRM technologies would reflect a small amount of incoming solar 
radiation back into space before it can warm the planet. Leading proposals include introducing 
reflective particles into the stratosphere (stratospheric aerosol injection or “SAI”) and artificially 
whitening clouds (marine cloud brightening or “MCB”). Other potential ways to increase 
planetary albedo range from brightening natural or human-made features at ground level all the 
way up to introducing mirrors into Earth’s orbit. 
 
SRM has been described as “fast, cheap, and imperfect” (Mahajan et al 2018). Some computer-
based modeling and studies of natural analogues (most notably volcanic eruptions) have 
suggested that planetary-scale SAI, in particular, could generate rapid and, depending on the 
magnitude of an intervention, dramatic cooling (NRC 2015). This suggests that SRM could be a 
“fast” response to climate change compared to mitigation. SRM could also be relatively 
inexpensive.  One study estimated the cost of a global SAI scheme at around $2.5 billion per 
year for the first 15 years (Smith and Wagner 2018), although other studies have estimated costs 
in the range of $10-20 billion per year (Moriyama et al. 2017).1 This is “cheap” when compared 
to the costs associated with mitigation, or when compared to the projected costs, including 
welfare costs, of unchecked atmospheric warming. Finally, SRM is “imperfect.” If deployed, it 
would not return the planet to some predictable former state. Nor is it a substitute for aggressive 
greenhouse gas reductions. There are also risks attached to SRM, some that cut across the entire 
enterprise and some that are dependent on type and scale of use, as discussed below. 
 
Thus, although SRM may emerge as a useful component of a global response to climate change, 
there is also good reason for caution. There are questions about whether SRM should be 
developed at all, or whether prompting too open a consideration of SRM distracts from 
mitigation and adaptation. If research moves forward, how ought it to be governed? What can be 
done to steer SRM developments towards the climate risks that face the most vulnerable? How 
can SRM be effectively and fairly governed? 
 
In fall 2018, the Academic Working Group on Climate Engineering Governance (the Working 
Group) released a policy report, “Governing Solar Radiation Management,” which addressed 
these questions and made recommendations for near-term SRM governance.2 The Working 
Group consisted of fourteen scholars with a variety of interests and disciplinary expertise in 
global environmental governance. The Working Group met for five deliberative workshops 
 
1 Cost estimates for SAI vary depending on assumptions of deployment technique and for given degrees of cooling. 
Importantly, Smith and Wagner (2018) provide an estimate for low altitude injection, whereas Moriyama et al. 
(2017) provide an estimate for high-altitude injection using newly designed aircraft (which lowers the cost 
substantially from using existing aircraft). 
2 The Working Group was assembled by the Forum for Climate Engineering Assessment (FCEA) based at American 
University in Washington D.C., with support for meetings and other activities provided by the V. Kann Rasmussen 
Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and Open Philanthropy. 
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between March 2016 and February 2018. The chief findings of the Working Group’s report are 
detailed below.3   
 
Background on the Process 
 
The Working Group faced significant challenges. The group was tasked with distilling consensus 
governance recommendations in an area outside their immediate empirical expertise. That is, 
although Working Group members were all established experts in various aspects of global 
environmental governance, they were selected precisely because they were new to the empirical 
area of climate engineering. The Forum for Climate Engineering Assessment (FCEA), which 
assembled the Working Group, made this decision to address concerns that discussions 
surrounding climate engineering were too insular (see, for example, Hamilton 2013). The 
members of the group had to quickly become experts in the existing SRM governance literature 
and policy conversation, so that they could bring their established expertise to the topic.4 
 
Throughout the process, the group was divided–sometimes sharply—on the ultimate wisdom of 
deploying SRM technologies. This reflected the choice to convene a group with diverse 
perspectives, leading to a very different report and set of recommendations than would have been 
produced had the group consisted solely of ardent supporters or vehement critics of SRM 
technologies. 
 
Due to its divided nature, the group decided to leave unanswered the basic question of whether 
SRM technologies are desirable. Instead, it started from a shared acknowledgement that SRM 
research is moving forward, if slowly, and that the largely ungoverned status quo is 
unsatisfactory. The group bounded its deliberations by focusing on governance of plausible near-
term (meaning out to 2025) SRM research pathways rather than on speculative far-term 
deployment scenarios. As a result, its recommendations focused on what might realistically be 
done to govern SRM technologies within the current international system.  
 
Governance objectives 
 
Governing the development (or not) of SRM means navigating between sometimes competing 
potential benefits and risks. When it comes to near-term SRM research, the Working Group 
recognized that there are risks associated with allowing research, but that there are also risks 
associated with not allowing research. The Working Group also identified a range of risks 
associated with deploying or not deploying SRM and with governing SRM. 
 
 
[TEXT BOX: Risk-Risk Tradeoffs in SRM Research and Deployment] 
 
3 All recommendations presented in this article are derived from the Working Group Report (See Chhetri et al. 
2018).  
4 The Working Group members quickly developed such expertise as is evidenced in a series of peer reviewed 
publications  on SRM governance published by group members  since the group was assembled in March 2016. See, 
for example Conca 2018, Flegal and Gupta 2018; Gupta and Möller 2018; Jinnah 2018; Jinnah and Bushey 2017; 
Jinnah and Nicholson 2019; Jinnah et al. 2019; McKinnon 2018; Nicholson et al. 2018; Thiele 2018.  
AWG SRM Governance 5.25.2019  3 
Decisions about how or whether to research, deploy, and govern SRM face a series of risk-risk 
tradeoffs. The Working Group’s report summarizes the literature on these risks (Chhetri et al. 
2018, pp. 4–5).  
Some commentators worry that researching SRM creates risks of: a “moral hazard” 
effect, in which SRM research distracts from mitigation efforts; technological “lock-in” that 
prematurely focuses research on particular SRM technologies or inappropriately accelerates a 
drive toward deployment; capture by special interests; and the facilitation of rogue deployment. 
Others worry that not researching SRM would leave societies without adequate information 
about SRM and without the ability to deploy SRM quickly or responsibly if that were deemed 
appropriate. 
Commentators have flagged a wide range of potential risks from deployment. These 
include undesirable environmental impacts and the inequitable distribution of burdens and 
benefits, as well as risks of geopolitical conflict and technological lock-in. In some 
circumstances, deployment could create a risk of “termination shock,” in which an abrupt 
cessation of SRM leads to rapid warming. These risks would need to be weighed against the 
grave environmental, social, ethical, and geopolitical risks arising from climate change.  
Different governance arrangements could create additional risks. Poorly designed or 
implemented governance mechanisms could channel SRM research in inappropriate directions or 
make it harder to integrate discussions of SRM into the broader climate policy debate. Since 
governance could either facilitate or restrain research, governance mechanisms must navigate 
between inappropriately shackling research and exacerbating the risks of research. Finally, some 
ways of designing governance could impose undue costs on or exclude those most vulnerable to 
climate change and the impacts of SRM. 
[END TEXT BOX] 
 
The efforts of the Working Group were, from inception, meant to be pragmatic and policy-
focused. The ultimate goal was to “bridge the gap between the existing academic literature on the 
governance of SRM and the need for actionable, authoritative advice for governing SRM in the 
near term, in particular” (Chhetri et al. 2018, p. 10). With this goal in mind, the deliberations of 
the Working Group settled on a set of governance objectives to guide their jointly-authored 
report. That is, the group asked and answered the questions, “What near term steps should be 
taken toward the governance of [SRM]? What objectives should those actions serve?” (Chhetri et 
al. 2018, p. 1). 
 
The Working Group identified four objectives for SRM governance: 
 
Objective I — Keep mitigation and adaptation first. 
Centrally, governance must ensure that if SRM is ever considered, it remains subsidiary to 
mitigation and adaptation measures. SRM does not replace the need for large-scale emission 
reductions for a host of reasons, including but not limited to the fact that SRM does not address 
many climate impacts, such as ocean acidification, and if SRM is ever deployed, multiple aspects 
of the climate may be affected, such as precipitation and regional temperature patterns, thereby 
introducing more uncertainty into an already changing climate.  
 
Objective II — Thoroughly and transparently evaluate risks, burdens, and benefits 
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Developing the capacity for broad-based assessment of potential risks, burdens, and benefits of 
SRM will be necessary to ensure that society can anticipate, understand, reduce, and manage 
associated risks, which will vary depending on the circumstances of deployment. Importantly, 
“broad-based” assessment entails an inclusive and transparent approach that allows for 
meaningful input from diverse voices, including those who are most vulnerable to climate 
change or any potential risks from SRM research or deployment. Conducting this assessment 
will require both social capacities, such as institutions for settling disputes and making decisions 
as conditions change,  as well as technological capacities, such as satellites for monitoring any 
potential field tests or deployment.  
 
Objective III — Enable responsible knowledge creation 
Governance should ensure that any SRM-related research is responsive to societal needs and 
concerns to the greatest extent possible. This serves two purposes. First, governance 
arrangements can facilitate research that is transparent, accountable, and socially appropriate, as 
well ensure that this research can anticipate and is responsive to societal needs and concerns. 
Second, these arrangements can help to prevent undesirable or irresponsible research pathways 
and outcomes. In order to pursue this objective, it will be necessary, but not sufficient, to 
disseminate information about research and its findings in publicly accessible ways; develop 
ways for diverse groups, including marginalized communities to contribute to and shape research 
programs; and clarify the responsibilities of researchers engaged in SRM research while still 
enabling responsible knowledge creation.  
 
Objective IV — Ensure robust governance before any consideration of deployment  
Governance should begin the near-term work of establishing effective institutions and norms to 
govern decisions about potential deployment. This near-term work will focus on governance of 
research as well as how SRM is deliberated, laying the groundwork for how decisions about 
potential deployment will be governed down the road. Pursuing this objective requires expanding 
the capacity of existing institutitions and perhaps creating new ones. This will require 
coordination between numerous countries and actors with diverse interests. Therefore, the 
arrangements for governing near-term SRM research must be flexible enough to evolve 
alongside SRM research and changing societal needs, and there must be a good fit between 
institutions’ mandates and capacity and the demands of evolving SRM governance.  
 
Recommendations: Concrete Near-term Governance Steps 
 
To advance the governance objectives identified above, the Working Group developed twelve 
recommendations, grouped into three clusters. The recommendations focused on the near term, 
for two primary reasons. First, SRM technologies are largely conceptual. While there has been 
computer modelling and examination of natural analogues (e.g. volcanic eruptions), there has so 
far been only modest interest in outdoor experimentation relating to any SRM scheme that might 
ultimately have large climatic impacts. Any governance moves at this point would largely be 
anticipatory, looking to get out in front of an emerging technology that might one day become 
real. The context in which SRM is evolving is always in flux, making the issuing of firm longer-
term recommendations about governance arrangements somewhat premature. Second, if research 
were to accelerate, there would be benefit in having some clear near-term signposts and rules of 
the road.   
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The twelve recommendations organized into their three clusters are as follows: 
 
Create politically legitimate deliberative bodies 
1. Establish a World Commission on SRM 
2. Establish a Global Forum for stakeholder dialogue 
 
Leverage existing institutions 
3. Strengthen cooperation between international organizations 
4. Assess and improve capacities for regional coordination and conflict resolution 
5. Continue ongoing assessment role for IPCC and related processes 
6. Develop foresight capabilities 
 
Make research transparent and accountable 
7. Report on SRM research and development activities in the global stocktake under the 
Paris Agreement 
8. Institutionalize codes of conduct for responsible SRM research 
9. Ensure that ongoing research includes international and interdisciplinary collaboration 
10. Clarify funding streams 
11. Develop a publicly accessible clearinghouse 
12. Develop best practices for risk and impact assessments 
 
Although a discussion of all twelve recommendations is beyond the scope of this paper, this 
section discusses the rationale behind each cluster and elaborates on 1-2 recommendations from 
each cluster.  
 
The first cluster, creating politically legitimate deliberative bodies, is an essential aspect of 
developing legitimate processes and arrangements in the near term that enable the high-level 
international coordination and guidance that SRM demands while providing institutional 
mechanisms for facilitating meaningful stakeholder engagement. To date, most policy 
recommendations in this space, including the report summarized here, have come from scientists 
and other academic experts.  The Working Group recommends creating institutions to enable 
more broad-based, participatory discussions of SRM as a potential response to climate change.  
 
To this end, the Working Group recommends that the United Nations General Assembly should 
appoint a World Commission on SRM with members appointed by UN Secretary General based 
on various diversity criteria. This Commission should have the mandate to debate “first-order 
questions about whether and to what end SRM should be researched and developed, and how it 
fits within a broader climate response landscape” (Chhetri et al. 2018, p. 30). In the near term, 
important questions to be discussed by the Commission include whether to impose a moratorium 
on certain forms of SRM research or deployment, and how to develop an intellectual property 
regime that ensures technological innovation is conducted in the public interest. Such a high-
level representative Commission will enhance the political legitimacy of SRM research and 
garner the resources and attention needed to undertake various forms of broad-based 
engagement. Building on suggestions by Edward Parson (2017), the Working Group identifies 
design elements for the Commission, such as high-level authorization and sufficient staff and 
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resources. The Group refrains from endorsing any specific design because this will be developed 
through international negotiations.  
 
Central to the World Commission’s mandate would be to develop a Global Forum for 
Stakeholder Dialogue to engage a wide variety of stakeholders in  “cross-border and cross-scale 
discussions on SRM and its governance” (Chhetri et al. 2018, p. 32). The Forum should identify 
relevant stakeholders, especially those which might be otherwise marginalized from global 
governance, such as: local communities, peasant organizations, indigenous peoples, youth 
organizations, women’s groups, labor unions, and others. The Forum’s mandate should include, 
inter alia, engaging stakeholders in SRM research; facilitating debate over SRM governance; and 
collecting policy preferences from stakeholders and their communities. To this end, the Forum 
should be connected to national and sub-national bodies. Importantly, the Working Group argues 
that the purpose of such a Forum should not be to arrive at consensus, but to initiate a “learning-
oriented dialogue.” Moreover, to make stakeholder engagement meaningful, contentious 
concerns must not be merely dismissed, but instead all concerns must be addressed and 
responded to. Finally, although it should be constituted by the World Commission, the Forum 
should be independent and empowered to set the agenda of and advise the Commission.  
 
The second cluster of recommendations, to leverage existing institutions, is necessary to fulfill 
the short-term governance objectives developed by the Working Group. Given their reticence to 
discuss SRM, it is unlikely that states will create a new institution to govern SRM. Although a 
new institution for SRM governance may be desirable in the longer-term, existing institutions 
have the capacity and interest to govern various near-term elements of SRM (Nicholson et al 
2018). These institutions can begin building the foundation for future governance and can 
achieve short-term governance goals, such as increasing transparency around SRM research.  
 
To this end, cooperation between international organizations must be strengthened, a task that 
should be pursued jointly by secretariats of relevant international organizations, national heads of 
government research offices, and the UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination. Increasing 
coordination between international organizations working in the fields of sustainable 
development, agriculture, education, human health, and more helps to ensure that governance: is 
inclusive of institutional stakeholders, avoids duplication of effort, utilizes resources and 
expertise efficiently, and helps to identify existing governance capacities and gaps.  
 
The Working Group also recommends an ongoing role for the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change and other relevant bodies in assessing the state of SRM research. Assessing 
SRM research within the established processes helps ensure that SRM is not discussed in a 
vacuum, but rather it is contextualized within current knowledge on climate change and 
mitigation and adaptation efforts. Furthermore, these assessments should incorporate literature 
that is critical of SRM and be multidisciplinary, including governance-related research and 
inquiries in ethics and justice.  
 
The third cluster of recommendations, making research transparent and accountable, is necessary 
to ensure that SRM research is legitimate and that it is conducted in the public interest, with 
public participation and steering of research as appropriate.  
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To this end, the Working Group recommends that states be encouraged to report on SRM 
research and development activities under the Global Stocktake, the primary transparency-
enhancing mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The Stocktake is intended to assess collective 
progress towards the goals of the Agreement and to inform the pledging of Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs). Though the Stocktake is still being designed, if it receives a 
broad mandate to assess technologies that may impact the goals of the Agreement, the Working 
Group recommends that the Stocktake include a comprehensive account of SRM research 
efforts.  
 
Finally, the Working Group recommends the development of a publicly accessible clearinghouse 
of all publicly funded and, to the greatest extent possible, privately funded SRM research. Such a 
clearinghouse would support public engagement in SRM research and help coordinate research 
priorities. The Working Group notes that although some actors may refuse to voluntarily 
contribute information, states should require these actors to participate with reasonable 
restrictions on the information that needs to be disclosed. The Working Group recommends a 
curated clearinghouse model that allows data to be contextualized to assist public understanding 
and use of the data, as opposed to a research database of individual studies (Craik and Moore 
2014).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Working Group argues that SRM governance should begin now. Some members see SRM 
development as desirable; some as potentially dangerous. Whatever the perspective, governance 
will be required to prompt the careful deliberation and oversight needed to make decisions about 
SRM in the societal interest. The Working Group’s recommendations establish essential rules 
and institutional arrangements for near-term understanding and guidance of SRM research and 
begin building the scaffolding for effective long-term governance. 
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